Professor Emeritus, Department of Finance and Department of Economics, University of Illinois
Visiting Scholar, Bank of Canada
Department of Finance webpage
Department of Economics webpage
Papers downloadable from Ideas/Repec
Papers downloadable from SSRN
Papers downloadable from Ideas/Repec
Papers downloadable from SSRN
Literature Review and Framework for Institutional Investor Mobilization ( 2023 ) Digital Money and Central Bank Operations ( 2022 )
The Demand for Programmable Payments ( 2022 )
Best Before? Expiring Central Bank Digital Currency and Loss Recovery ( 2021 )
The Role of Pilot Studies in Financial Regulation ( 2021 )
Security and Convenience of a Bank Digital Currency ( 2020 )Statement on Evidence-Based Regulation and the Limits of Pilot Studies ( 2019 )
Eggs in One Basket: Security and Convenience of Digital Currencies ( 2019 )
Choice of Collateral Asset and the Cross-Border Effect of Automatic Stays ( 2016 ) Governance through Threat of Voice and Threat of Exit ( 2015 ) Time Consistency in Bank Regulation: Leverage and Bailout ( 2015 ) Law as a constraint on the 'lender of last resort': Central bank liquidity support for central counterparties ( 2015 )
Systemic Risk and Optimal Regulatory Architecture ( 2011 )
Toward Time-Consistency in Bank Regulation ( 2011 )
Collateral Policy in a World of Round-the-Clock Payment ( 2009 )
A theory of transactions privacy ( 2000 )
Coalition Proof Equilibrium in an Adverse Selection Insurance Economy ( 1995 )
On the efficiency of cash settlement ( 1995 )
Universal Coalition-Proof Equilibrium: Concepts and Applications ( 1993 )
The Role of Demandable Debt in Structuring Optimal Banking Arrangements ( 1989 ) Grasping De(centralized) Fi(nance) through the Lens of Economic Theory ( 2022 ) Discussion of "Payments on Digital Platforms: Resiliency, Interoperability and Welfare" ( 2022 ) Liquidity provision during a pandemic ( 2021 ) Sources of Liquidity and Liquidity Shortages ( 2021 ) Illiquidity as a Signal ( 2020 ) Should the Central Bank Issue E-Money? ( 2020 ) Collateral, Rehypothecation and Efficiency ( 2019 ) The Threat of Privacy ( 2018 ) Are there Social Spillovers in Consumers’ Security Assessments of Payment Instruments? ( 2017 ) Law as a constraint on bailouts: Emergency support for central counterparties. ( 2016 ) Collateral chains and Incentives. ( 2016 ) Comment on “Bailouts, moral hazard, and banks' home bias for sovereign debt” by Gaetano
Gaballo and Ariel Zetlin-Jones. ( 2016 ) The Regulatory Challenge of Non-Bank Payment Institutions, and the Response of PSD2. ( 2016 ) Payment Systems in the US and Europe: Efficiency, Soundness and
Challenges. ( 2016 ) Identity Theft and Consumer Payment Choice: Does Security Really Matter? ( 2015 )
Repos, Fire Sales, and Bankruptcy Policy. ( 2015 ) Private Payment Systems, Collateral, and Interest Rates. ( 2013 ) Comment on 'Precautionary Demand and Liquidity in Payment Systems' by Afonso and
Shin. ( 2011 ) Why Pay? An Introduction to Payments Economics. ( 2009 ) Payments Settlement: Tiering in Private and Public Systems. ( 2009 ) Credit and Identity Theft. ( 2008 ) Transferability, Finality and Debt Settlement. ( 2007 ) Comment on 'Who Should Act As Lender of Last Resort? An Incomplete Contracts Model' by Repullo. ( 2006 ) Bank Consolidation and the Dynamics of Consumer Loan Interest Rates. ( 2005 ) Low Revenue Equilibria in Simultaneous Ascending Price Auctions. ( 2005 ) Money Is Privacy. ( 2005 ) Allocating Bank Regulatory Power: Lender of Last Resort, Deposit Insurance and Supervision. ( 2005 ) Comment on 'Competition and Financial Stability' by Allen and Gale. ( 2004 ) Moral Hazard and Optimal Subsidiary Structure for Financial Institutions. ( 2004 ) Settlement Risk under Gross and Net Settlement. ( 2003 ) The Economics of Payment Finality. ( 2002 ) Multiunit Auctions in Which Almost Every Bid Wins. ( 2002 ) Performance-Based Wages in Tax Collection: The Brazilian Tax Collection Reform and Its Effects. ( 2001 ) Real Time Gross Settlement and the Costs of Immediacy. ( 2001 ) Economic Functions of Referrals and Referral Fees. ( 2001 ) The Design of Wholesale Payments Networks: The Importance of Incentives. ( 1999 ) Strategic Transmission of Information and Short-Term Commitment. ( 1999 ) Bank Deposit Rate Clustering: Theory and Empirical Evidence. ( 1999 ) Calibration of a Model of the Afternoon Effect in Cattle Auctions. ( 1999 ) Demandable Debt as a Means of Payment: Bank Notes vs. Checks. ( 1999 ) Uniform-Price Auctions with Variable Awards. ( 1998 ) Competition and Incentives with Nonexclusive Contracts. ( 1998 ) Multi-Unit Auctions with Uniform Prices. ( 1998 ) Ownership Structure, Speculation and Shareholder Information. ( 1998 ) Payment System Settlement and Bank Incentives. ( 1998 ) One-Stop Shopping for Settlement Services: RESPA, Referral Fees, and Consumer Reaction. ( 1998 ) Multi-Unit Pay-Your-Bid Auctions with Variable Awards. ( 1998 ) The Efficiency of Self Regulated Payments Systems: Leaming from the Suffolk System. ( 1996 ) Coalition Proof Equilibrium in an Adverse Selection Insurance Economy. ( 1995 ) Market Failure with Moral Hazard and Side Trading. ( 1995 ) Housing-Finance Intervention and Private Incentives: Helping Minorities and the Poor. ( 1994 ) The Economic Role of Foreclosures. ( 1994 ) Introducing Work Rules into Models of Wage-Employment Contracts. ( 1993 ) Non Existence and Inefficiency of Equilibria with American Options and Convertible Bonds. ( 1993 ) An Equilibrium Model of Quits Under Optimal Contracting. ( 1993 ) Exclusion and Moral Hazard: The Case of Identical Demand. ( 1993 ) The Existence and Characterization of Optimal Contracts on a Continuous State Space. ( 1993 ) The Good, the Bad and the Ugly: Coalition-Proof Equilibrium in Infinite Games. ( 1992 ) Protecting the Winner: Second-Price Versus Oral Auctions. ( 1991 ) The Role of Demandable Debt in Structuring Optimal Banking Arrangements. ( 1991 ) The Economic Role of Foreclosure Rules. ( 1991 ) Cooperative Arrangements for the Regulation of Banking by Banks. ( 1990 ) Default, Foreclosure and Strategic Renegotiation. ( 1989 ) The Use of Complicated Models as Explanations: A Re-examination of Williamson's Late 19th Century America. ( 1988 ) Limited Contract Enforcement and Strategic Renegotiation. ( 1988 ) Two-Sided Uncertainty and Up-or-Out Contracts. ( 1988 ) A Competitive Efficiency Wage Model with Keynesian Features. ( 1988 ) Strategic Renegotiation. ( 1988 ) Erratum: The Durable Goods Monopolist and Consistency with Increasing Costs. ( 1988 ) The Durable Goods Monopolist and Consistency with Increasing Costs. ( 1986 ) Optimal Employment Contracts with Bankruptcy Constraints. ( 1985 ) Optimal Severance Pay with Incomplete Information. ( 1985 ) Wage-Employment Contracts. ( 1983 ) The Solution of Linear Difference Models Under Rational Expectations. ( 1980 )Privacy Provision, Latency and the Role of Collateral ( 2020 ) Central Banks and Payment Systems: The Evolving Trade-off between Cost and Risk. ( 2016 ) Clearing House Interbank Payments System (CHIPS). ( 2012 )Some Implications of Systemic Risk and the Design of
Regulatory Architecture. ( 2011 ) Institutional Allocation of Bank Regulation: A Review. ( 2007 ) Allocating Lending of Last Resort and Supervision in the Euro Area. ( 2004 ) Modeling of Choices with Uncertain Preferences. ( 1994 ) An Agency Theory Approach to Slave Incentives. ( 1992 ) A Linear Programming Solution to the Slave Diet. ( 1992 ) Evolution of money and payment systems: private versus public institutions and the role of collateral (2015) The CLS Bank: A Solution to the Risks of International Payments Settlement? ( 2001 ) Semi-Stability in Game Theory: A Survey of Ugliness. ( 1992 ) Demandable Debt as the Optimal Banking Contract. ( 1988 ) Low blood lead level effects on intelligence: Can a dose-response curve be determined from the epidemiological data? Effective Oversight of Payment and Settlement Systems: Maintaining financial plumbing Review of Roger Bowden's 'Statistical Games and Human Affairs'
Interview with Dr. Charles Kahn
Why Central Banks Shouldn't Ignore Stablecoins
Why “Paying in Rubles” May Prove Irrelevant Should the United States Issue a
Central Bank Digital Currency?
Lessons from Abroad
If stablecoins are money, they should be backed by reserves
What Do Robocalls and Money Laundering Have in Common?
Standing Repo Facilities, Then and Now Are Banks Special? A Fintech Perspective
Center for Business and Public Policy, University of Illinois College of Business, blog postings 